Log In | Subscribe | | |

Money Laundering

Continuing our analysis of how Australia's Proceeds of Crime Act provides a mechanism for successful money laundering.

See Part I here

Late-stage money laundering is after the proceeds of criminal conduct have already been through a series of transactions to hide, move and even invest them. As the proceeds move further away from the original source, their origin is obscured but they are still not safe. Late-stage laundering usually involves using financial institutions or jurisdictions that are known to have good systems in place and therefore the next move is with the benefit of their reputation. Australia, on the other hand, provides - enshrined in its law - a safe haven that provides positive encouragement to launderers to place late-stage laundering there.

Part II here

It all began when the Philippines was found to have been the destination for the money stolen from the Central Bank of Bangladesh and, all over the world, fingers began to be pointed at the country's Swiss-cheese like counter-money laundering regime. What was especially bemusing to outsiders was that while the country was on one level constantly engaged in a battle with terrorists in the south, the laws to combat the funding of terrorism were in a similarly poor condition. Stung by criticism, the Philippines began to review its laws. One major area that had been entirely left out of account was casinos. In the past few months, that has dramatically changed.

Why, some might ask, is World Money Laundering Report drawing attention to violent crime statistics? "The figures released by the US government this week demonstrate that people engage in crime amongst those they have a major factor in common with, the "people like us" syndrome I discuss in "Understanding Suspicion in Financial Crime. Crime committed within defined groups, be they racial, social, religious or other groups, are at the heart of how and why so many offences are committed," Nigel Morris-Cotterill writes.

The final part of this article.

Continued from Part IV of this article

Continued from Part III of this article

Continued from Part II of this article

Part I is here

This paper, by Nigel Morris-Cotterill, was first presented in June 1997 in Milan and first published in the UK that same month.

It deals with internet banking, cyber-currencies, inter-bank regulatory risk and a host of other topics that are seen as trendy today.

------------------------

Fraud using technology is not a new occurrence Over the centuries, it has been called by many names - cheating, false accounting, confidence tricks, forgery, impersonation - all are examples of fraud in the widest sense.

This article was first published by Nigel Morris-Cotterill in June 2003
----------------

The financial services industry is getting only part of the risk management and anti-money laundering point. And modern business models in banking and insurance militate against effective know-your- customer procedures says Nigel Morris-Cotterill of The Anti Money Laundering Network.

Case Summary: 

Heon-Cheol Chi, 59, of South Korea, has been convicted of money laundering using a bank account in the USA in connection with bribes received in relation to his work as director of South Korea's Earthquake Research Centre, a division of the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources (KIGAM).

Type of conduct: 
Corruption

This article, by Nigel Morris-Cotterill, was first published in September 2002. It is, in part based on a briefing to banks, etc, in London in November 2001 and draws attention to the effect of the money laundering, etc. provisions of the just in-force USA PATRIOT Act.

BIScom Subsection: 

As China continues is increasingly effective "Operation Fox Hunt" against corrupt officials who have left China with their spoils, or sent their money abroad in the hope of hiding it, there is growing co-operation between Chinese authorities and those in the countries where people and/or assets are located. Australia is one country that has been helping. But a thorny old question remains.

For much of the past 25 years, Nigel Morris-Cotterill has argued that any corporate structure that goes is more than three layers deep should be regarded as prima facie suspicious unless a good commercial and legal reason can be established. Incredible India, which is turning from a sink hole for dirty money into a leader in developing structures and policies to combat financial crime has just announced that Indian groups will not be permitted to have more than two layers of subsidiaries. That's going to cause major consternation amongst Indian corporates which use complex structures to minimise tax revenues and to avoid exchange control measures, as well as to hide proceeds of fraud and other offences.

A purported mailing list broker is marketing a list of users of money laundering, etc. risk management software. There are clear security implications for officers in sensitive functions, if the list is what it claims to be and money laundering risk officers, etc. should therefore be aware that information relating to them and their employers and suppliers is being indiscriminately touted for sale.

Pages

 


 

Amazon ads

| |